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ARAKAN

Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO)



- Roads Over Our Graves
- No army can build a nation by erasing its people
- Malaysia’s Rohingya hate campaign and the politics of exile
- Justice beyond the junta: accountability in Arakan

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GEOPOLITICS

Roads Over Our Graves

How India and China's Race Through Rakhine Is Leaving the Rohingya Behind

Two of Asia's most ambitious infrastructure corridors now run through Rakhine State: one built by India, one by China. Both pass through territory controlled by the Arakan Army, an armed group accused of grave abuses against Rohingya civilians. And both are planned as if the Rohingya do not exist.

Look at a map of the Bay of Bengal and you will see why the world's two most populous powers are converging on one small corner of Myanmar. Rakhine State has become the meeting point of two grand designs: India's Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, linking Kolkata to its landlocked northeast through Sittwe Port, and China's emerging economic corridor running from Kunming through Mandalay and Rakhine toward Chittagong, anchored by the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port.

On paper, these corridors promise trade, connectivity, and shared prosperity. On the ground, they run through a landscape shaped by genocide, mass displacement, and a new armed authority, the Arakan Army, that now controls much of the territory these projects depend on.

One thing is conspicuously absent from the rosy corridor maps: the fate of more than a million Rohingya refugees confined to camps in Bangladesh and scattered in exile worldwide, and the rights of those still inside Myanmar living under systemic discrimination and insecurity.

KALADAN: INDIA'S CORRIDOR, THE ARAKAN ARMY'S LIFELINE

The Kaladan project connects India's eastern seaboard to Sittwe Port in Rakhine State, moves up the Kaladan River toward Paletwa in Chin State, and links onward to Mizoram. For New Delhi, this is more than a trade route: it is a way to bypass the narrow Siliguri Corridor while expanding influence in the Bay of Bengal.

But the political reality on the ground has changed. The Arakan Army now controls or influences much of the territory through which the Kaladan route passes. What began as an Indian connectivity project has become a strategic asset in the hands of a non-state armed group. By positioning itself as the force that can either protect or disrupt Kaladan, the AA has gained real influence over India.

Sittwe and Paletwa are strategic gateways rather than simple transit points. For India, engaging the AA may appear necessary to protect a major investment. But doing so without human-rights conditions risks legitimising an armed authority accused of serious abuses against Rohingya civilians.



India and China's strategic corridors through Rakhine

KYAUKPHYU: CHINA'S PRIZE AND THE AA'S PRESSURE POINT

While Kaladan gives the Arakan Army a hold over India, Kyaukphyu gives it a hold over China. Kyaukphyu is one of Beijing's most important strategic projects in Myanmar: a deep-sea port, a special economic zone, and twin oil and gas pipelines connecting the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan Province.

For China, the value goes well beyond economics. The port offers a gateway to the Indian Ocean and a way to reduce dependence on the congested and vulnerable Malacca Strait. Chinese state-owned firms hold majority stakes in these projects, and Chinese diplomats have repeatedly pressed successive governments in Naypyidaw to speed up implementation even as fighting escalates.

The AA's advance toward Kyaukphyu has therefore raised serious concern in Beijing. It does not need to capture Kyaukphyu to pressure China. It only needs to show that China's projects cannot function safely without dealing with the AA.

This is the heart of the AA's two-corridor strategy: Kaladan to gain relevance with India, Kyaukphyu to pressure China. In both cases, foreign infrastructure has become a political bargaining chip.

> *"A population that has suffered mass violence, ethnic cleansing and decades of legal erasure cannot simply be ignored while roads, ports and pipelines are laid across their homeland."*
>
> THE HUMAN COST

THE HUMAN COST BEHIND THE CORRIDOR MAPS

The danger is that regional powers will focus only on roads, ports, and trade while ignoring the people living under AA control. For the Rohingya, none of this is an abstract geopolitical game; their survival is at stake.

Human rights organisations have documented serious allegations against the Arakan Army, including movement restrictions, arbitrary detention, forced labour, forced recruitment, village destruction, looting, and attacks on Rohingya civilians. Rohingya communities describe a life of fear under a new armed authority that has repeated many of the same patterns of exclusion and control long used by the Myanmar military.

The Rohingya have already survived genocide, mass displacement, apartheid-like restrictions, and the systematic denial of citizenship. A population that has suffered mass violence and decades of legal erasure cannot simply be ignored while roads, ports, and pipelines are laid across their homeland.

The AA is a non-state armed group, but that does not place it outside international law. If it seeks political recognition, it must also accept responsibility for its actions.

BANGLADESH: FRONTLINE STATE, RISING THREAT, REAL LEVERAGE

The AA's rise is not only a Myanmar problem. Bangladesh already hosts around one million Rohingya refugees, and any future repatriation will depend heavily on conditions in northern Rakhine, where the AA now holds significant power. If the AA continues to deny safety, citizenship and dignity to Rohingya civilians, repatriation will remain impossible.

Bangladesh also faces mounting security risks. Border insecurity, narcotics trafficking and incidents involving Bangladeshi fishermen have made the AA's expanding influence a direct concern for Dhaka.

Yet Bangladesh is not powerless. The proposed China–Myanmar–Bangladesh economic corridor changes the diplomatic calculus. Dhaka is no longer just a recipient of Chinese investment; it is a pivotal node in a strategic route that Beijing considers vital. That leverage should be used.



WHAT INDIA, CHINA AND THE WORLD MUST DO

India must not treat Kaladan as only a connectivity project. Any engagement with the Arakan Army should be conditional on civilian protection, humanitarian access and respect for Rohingya rights.

China must not treat Kyaukphyu as an investment to be secured at any cost. If Beijing truly seeks long-term security for its investments, it should recognise that genuine stability in Rakhine requires resolving the Rohingya question: restoring legal status, ensuring physical protection, and enabling safe, voluntary and dignified return under conditions of equal citizenship.

Bangladesh can press for practical commitments linked to corridor development: legal reforms restoring Rohingya citizenship, security arrangements preventing further persecution, community consultation, inclusive hiring, and clear benchmarks tying infrastructure rollout to progress on rights.

Crucially, Rohingya voices themselves must be part of the conversation. Too often, negotiations about their future happen over their heads.

NO CORRIDOR WITHOUT JUSTICE

Kaladan and the Kunming–Mandalay–Rakhine–Chittagong corridor can become routes through which goods and profits flow over the graves and dispossession of the Rohingya, or they can become platforms for rectifying a historic wrong and building a genuinely shared future.

Rakhine's future cannot be decided only by armed groups and foreign powers.

COMMENTARY

No Army Has Ever Built a Nation by Erasing Half the People in It

Rakhine cannot be built by exclusion, and Arakan cannot progress by pretending that one of its foundational peoples does not belong.

Decades of violence and engineered expulsion have already shown that the attempt to erase the Rohingya has not brought peace, prosperity or stability to Rakhine State or to the Union of Myanmar. The opposite has happened. Every major effort to remove, suppress or politically nullify the Rohingya has widened the conflict, hardened communal fear and damaged the economy. It has discredited the state internationally and deepened Myanmar's long crisis of legitimacy.

History bears this out. No army has ever built a nation by erasing half the people in it. No ruling elite has ever secured a lasting future through mass exclusion. A homeland emptied of one community does not become stronger; it becomes morally broken, politically unstable and permanently at war with itself.

> *"A homeland emptied of one community does not become stronger; it becomes morally broken, politically unstable and permanently at war with itself."*
>
> THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT

THE LESSON OF FAILED GENOCIDE

Since 1942, in different periods and under different political banners, the Rohingya have faced recurring campaigns of massacre, expulsion and state-backed persecution, alongside dispossession and denationalisation in their ancestral homeland.

Later decades repeated the same logic with new methods. Discriminatory state policies driven above all by the Myanmar military, most notably the 1982 Citizenship Law, stripped Rohingya of rights, restricted movement and triggered repeated mass flight. The result was never national consolidation but recurring refugee crises, deeper separation and a state increasingly defined by repression rather than justice.

The violence of 2012 provided another devastating example. Organised attacks, mass displacement, segregation and the destruction of communities turned anti-Rohingya hatred into policy. Then came the 2016 and especially the 2017 military operations. Entire villages were burned, families were torn apart and hundreds of thousands were forced into Bangladesh.

RAKHINE WITHOUT ROHINGYA IS NOT A VISION

A region cannot claim to seek reconstruction while normalising the destruction, exile or permanent exclusion of a people who have lived there for generations. Rakhine will never be fully rebuilt without the Rohingya. Its human geography, economic life, agricultural productivity, coastal trade routes, labour systems and historical memory cannot be honestly described without Rohingya presence.

To insist on a future without Rohingya is to insist on a future of camps, militarised borders, displaced populations, contested legitimacy and endless political crisis.

This matters not only morally but structurally. Sustainable development requires trust in institutions, secure land rights, freedom of movement, access to education, functioning markets and social cooperation across communities. The persecution and attempted destruction of the Rohingya have undermined every one of those conditions in Rakhine.

Even those who believed exclusion would strengthen ethnic Rakhine political claims should now see the historic error. The marginalisation of the Rohingya did not liberate Rakhine from crisis; it helped entrench crisis as the region’s governing reality.

A MISTAKE AGAINST ALL PEOPLE

The campaign against the Rohingya has often been presented by its defenders as necessary for security, sovereignty or demographic protection. But history has shown it to be a severe mistake for the Rohingya, for the Rakhine people and for the whole Union of Myanmar.

For the Rohingya, the consequences are statelessness, genocide, mass displacement, killings, destroyed villages, family separation and denial of identity. For the Rakhine people, the consequences have included deeper militarisation, chronic instability, blocked development and the loss of an inclusive regional future capable of supporting peace and prosperity.

For Myanmar as a whole, the genocide against the Rohingya became a defining symbol of impunity. It damaged the country’s international standing, intensified demands for justice and demonstrated how a state built on exclusion can reproduce violence far beyond one region.

This is why the Rohingya question has never been a “minority issue” alone. It is a test of whether Myanmar can become a political community based on equal rights and shared citizenship, or remain trapped in a hierarchy of belonging enforced by force.

THE CHOICE BEFORE ARAKAN

Arakan now stands before a truth that can no longer be postponed. There will either be a future built on coexistence, political recognition, accountability and equal rights, or there will be a larger and ever-lasting war. There is no durable middle ground in which one people dominates, another remains erased, and peace somehow arrives on its own.

The effort to exterminate or permanently expel the Rohingya has already failed repeatedly. It failed in 1942, when the Rohingya endured and remained rooted in the land despite massacres and displacement. It failed again through decades of denationalisation, when persecution produced neither legitimacy nor stability. And it failed after 2012 and 2017, when mass atrocity did not end the political reality of the Rohingya; it globalised it, judicialised it and turned it into a permanent question of justice.

What remains is to choose wisdom over repetition. The Rohingya must be recognised not as a problem to be managed away, but as a people of Arakan whose rights, safety and political participation are essential to any serious future for the region.

No army has ever built a nation by erasing half the people in it. Rakhine will not rise through exclusion. Myanmar will not heal through denial. The only road away from collapse is justice, recognition and coexistence, and a political order in which Rohingya and Rakhine alike can live as equal stakeholders in their shared homeland.



DIASPORA

A PLEA FROM ONE MUSLIM NATION TO ANOTHER

THE 2026 HATE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ROHINGYA REFUGEES IN MALAYSIA, AND WHY STANDING WITH US IS ALSO MALAYSIA'S FUTURE

A FESTIVAL OF MERCY, TURNED INTO A WOUND

On the morning of 27 May 2026, Rohingya families across several Klang Valley neighbourhoods rose early to perform the korban, the ritual sacrifice that marks Hari Raya Aidiladha. For most Muslims, the korban is an act of devotion and a means of feeding the poor. For Rohingya, the act carries another meaning: gratitude for being alive and safe enough to celebrate.

In one neighbourhood, the community performed the slaughter of approximately sixty cattle during the festival. Local complaints followed over waste disposal. Those concerns were legitimate municipal issues, but what followed went far beyond sanitation.

Within seventy-two hours, an online petition titled "Remove Rohingya from Malaysia" had passed 130,000 signatures, according to sources cited in the article. A fabricated graphic, made to resemble a Malaysian news bulletin and attributed to a non-existent "President Rohingya Malaysia", began circulating widely.

By the first week of June, the article argues, many Rohingya families felt the atmosphere around them had changed dramatically.

A COMMUNITY ALREADY LIVING ON THE EDGE OF MEMORY

The manuscript frames the campaign not simply as an episode of online hostility, but as retraumatisation for a community of genocide survivors.

Many Rohingya in Malaysia arrived after fleeing persecution, displacement and violence in Myanmar. For them, words such as "remove" and "send them back" carry echoes of language that preceded earlier mass violence in Arakan.

The article argues that this history is why online misinformation has consequences beyond offence. It can reawaken fear among people who have already experienced displacement, statelessness and communal targeting.

Yet the article is also written as an appeal rather than a denunciation. It insists that Malaysia should not be reduced to the petition or to the loudest voices online. It points instead to nearly four decades of Malaysian shelter, public solidarity with the Rohingya, and institutions and neighbours who spoke out against the hate campaign.

WHAT THE ROHINGYA HAVE GIVEN MALAYSIA IN RETURN

A refugee community that has lived on a host country's soil for decades is not only a community of recipients. The article asks that the Rohingya contribution to Malaysia's economy and social fabric also be remembered.

It cites research by the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs arguing that legal access to work for refugees could add substantially to Malaysia's economy and tax base. The manuscript also points to the June 2026 Refugee Registration Document job-matching programme as evidence that refugee labour is increasingly being considered within formal policy.

For years, Rohingya workers have been present in construction, plantations, restaurants, logistics, recycling and other so-called 3D sectors. Many have also built small businesses in Selayang, Ampang, Cheras and Penang, paying rent, buying from Malaysian suppliers and serving local customers.

The article's broader point is that the Rohingya are not only a humanitarian responsibility. They are already part of Malaysia's economic story.

WHY STANDING WITH THE ROHINGYA SERVES MALAYSIA'S OWN FUTURE

The manuscript sets out a strategic as well as humanitarian case.

First, it argues that Malaysia's standing in the Muslim world has long been strengthened by visible solidarity with persecuted Muslim communities. Second, it links Malaysia's credibility on Myanmar and within ASEAN to how Rohingya are treated domestically.

Third, the article argues that Malaysia's labour needs make refugee regularisation a practical economic question as well as a moral one. Properly registered workers, it says, can contribute through labour, rent and taxation rather than remaining trapped in informal and vulnerable employment.

Finally, the article looks further ahead. It argues that Malaysia has an opportunity to be remembered, if and when Rohingya can safely return to Arakan, as a country that stood with them during exile rather than abandoning them.

That future-facing argument turns solidarity into something more than charity: a possible foundation for long-term diplomatic, commercial and social ties.

THE MALAYSIANS WHO REFUSED TO LOOK AWAY

The manuscript records not only the hate campaign but also the Malaysians who challenged it. It names civil-society institutions, journalists, academics, doctors, teachers, mosque committees, landlords and public officials who continued to defend or support Rohingya refugees when online hostility intensified.

Among the figures highlighted is Home Affairs Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, whom the article credits with framing refugee protection as more than a border-security question and with fronting the June 2026 DPP job-matching initiative.

The article also appeals directly to Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, asking that Malaysia's regional leadership on Myanmar be matched by clear protection of Rohingya refugees at home.

Its tone in this section is deliberately grateful. Rather than treating Malaysia as a single hostile actor, it distinguishes between the hate campaign and the institutions and individuals who resisted it.

A CLOSING WORD, FROM ONE MUSLIM NATION TO ANOTHER

The article closes with a simple claim: the Rohingya are not asking Malaysia for citizenship. They are asking that the country continue to offer the protection, dignity and social space that have allowed families to pray, marry, work, raise children and survive while return to Arakan remains unsafe.

It recalls Malaysia's public solidarity with the Rohingya in 2016, its regional role on Myanmar and the Malaysian institutions that pushed back against the 2026 petition and misinformation.

The final appeal is both emotional and strategic. Malaysia did not create the Rohingya catastrophe, the article states, but by geography and by choice it has become one of the important places of refuge in Southeast Asia. How it treats that responsibility will shape not only the lives of refugees now, but the relationship between Malaysia and a future Rohingya community able to return home in safety and dignity.

"To the Malaysians who stood with us this Eid: terima kasih dari hati kami yang paling dalam. Thank you, from the deepest place in our hearts. We will not forget."

HUMAN RIGHTS

THE ARAKAN ARMY IS USING RAPE AS A WEAPON OF GENOCIDE AGAINST ROHINGYA WOMEN

THE ARTICLE EXAMINES ALLEGATIONS THAT SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST ROHINGYA WOMEN AND GIRLS IS BECOMING EMBEDDED WITHIN SYSTEMS OF DETENTION, COERCION AND FORCED RECRUITMENT UNDER ARAKAN ARMY CONTROL.

For Rohingya women, the crime does not begin when the world finally finds the right legal term for it. It begins the moment armed men take control over movement, food, family survival, the body and the right to say no.

Abuses reported under Arakan Army control should not be treated as an accidental by product of war. It places them within a wider system of domination involving fear, detention, coercion, sexual violence and forced recruitment against a population already subjected to decades of persecution by the Myanmar military.

That framing is supported in part by recent documentation. In May 2026, the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK reported patterns of gang rape, threats of sexual violence, arbitrary detention and abuse linked to recruitment raids and incommunicado detention in AA-controlled areas, based on information gathered from May 2024 to April 2026. Human Rights Watch has separately documented movement restrictions, arbitrary detention, mistreatment, forced labour and unlawful recruitment of Rohingya under AA authority. The article's central argument is that changing the armed authority does not erase the structures of anti-Rohingya persecution.

THE BODY AS BATTLEFIELD

Rape in conflict is often dismissed as indiscipline or opportunism. That description fails when abuse appears in recurring patterns around detention, raids, recruitment and systems of command.

BROUK's 2026 report described sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls as increasingly embedded in detention, coercion and control. It documented alleged gang rape, threats of sexual violence and abuse linked to recruitment raids and incommunicado detention, particularly in Maungdaw and Buthidaung.

In such conditions, sexual violence extends beyond the individual victim. It becomes a warning to families and communities that armed power can reach into the most intimate parts of civilian life.

For the Rohingya, the pattern is especially alarming because the Myanmar military previously used rape and other forms of sexual violence during campaigns of mass persecution. The article argues that Rohingya women are again being forced to absorb violence within a broader political system of fear and exclusion.

FORCED RECRUITMENT THROUGH TERROR

The manuscript links sexual violence to a wider system of coercive recruitment. Human Rights Watch has documented unlawful recruitment of Rohingya, including children, as well as arrests, beatings, forced labour and other abuses under Arakan Army control.

For Rohingya women and girls, the article argues that recruitment pressure can intersect with a separate layer of gendered violence. BROUK's 2026 reporting describes alleged sexual violence during recruitment raids and detention, suggesting that rape and the threat of rape may function as tools of coercion as well as punishment.

Families are pushed into impossible choices: protect a son and risk collective punishment; comply and lose a child; speak out and risk further abuse. In systems of incommunicado detention, the line between recruitment, abduction, sexual exploitation, forced labour and disappearance can become dangerously thin.

Where individual cases remain difficult to verify, the article calls for careful reporting rather than silence.

FORCED LABOUR, FORCED SILENCE

Sexual violence rarely exists in isolation. The manuscript places it alongside forced labour, extortion, food deprivation, movement restrictions and arbitrary detention. Human Rights Watch has reported that Rohingya under AA control faced severe restrictions on work, travel and livelihoods, alongside forced labour and unlawful recruitment.

The article argues that these conditions reinforce one another. A woman whose family cannot move freely, earn income, access food or seek protection is more vulnerable to coercion. A girl taken during a raid is more vulnerable when her family has already been weakened by fear, statelessness and economic restriction.

Together, forced labour and sexual violence form part of what the article describes as an architecture of subjugation rather than isolated misconduct.

WHAT 2024 MADE VISIBLE

The article places the 2026 allegations within a longer pattern of violence that became especially visible from May 2024 onward, as the Arakan Army expanded control across northern Rakhine.

Fortify Rights documented widespread arson and destruction during the AA takeover of Buthidaung and later investigated the killing of more than one hundred Rohingya civilians along the Naf River on 5 and 6 August 2024. Human Rights Watch has also reported mass killings, arson, movement restrictions, forced labour and unlawful recruitment affecting Rohingya communities.

These events matter because they show that anti-junta resistance does not automatically dismantle anti-Rohingya persecution. A change in territorial control can leave the underlying structures of coercion intact.

BEFORE THEY NAMED IT

The article rejects the idea that a crime only becomes real once international institutions settle on terminology. For survivors, it argues, the abuse exists before an investigator publishes a report or a court adopts a legal characterisation.

That is why it calls for accountability that is consistent across perpetrators: sexual violence, forced labour, arbitrary detention, coercive recruitment and persecution should be scrutinised regardless of which armed actor is responsible.

2024–2026 DOCUMENTED PATTERNS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, DETENTION AND COERCIVE RECRUITMENT

WHAT MUST BE SAID PLAINLY

The conclusion is uncompromising: no armed movement can credibly claim liberation while women and girls live under threat of rape, detention, forced labour or coercive recruitment.

It argues that the international community should stop treating abuses against Rohingya women as secondary to the wider war. Where sexual violence is linked to detention, recruitment and communal repression, the article says it must be understood as central to systems of domination and persecution.

The evidentiary standard still matters. Individual allegations require careful verification, and legal characterisations should be made by competent investigative and judicial bodies. But the documented patterns are serious enough to demand investigation, protection of civilians and accountability for perpetrators.

The article closes with a simple principle: justice for Rohingya women cannot depend on which uniform the perpetrator wears.

ACCOUNTABILITY

The Junta on Trial While the Arakan Army Remains Untouched

Justice for the Rohingya cannot be selective. International accountability loses credibility if abuses by one armed actor are pursued while those of another are treated as politically inconvenient.

THE COURTS MATTER, BUT JUSTICE IS INCOMPLETE

The legal proceedings against Myanmar's military leadership are central to the international pursuit of accountability. The International Court of Justice is hearing The Gambia's case against Myanmar under the Genocide Convention. In January 2020, the Court ordered provisional measures requiring Myanmar to take steps to prevent acts within the scope of the Convention, preserve evidence and report on implementation. Those measures did not decide the merits of the genocide allegations; the case itself remains the forum for that determination.

The International Criminal Court is separately investigating alleged crimes connected to the deportation and persecution of the Rohingya. On 27 November 2024, the ICC Prosecutor filed an application for a warrant of arrest for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing for alleged crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution. As of 2026, that application remained pending before the relevant Pre-Trial Chamber.

These proceedings matter because they challenge impunity for mass atrocities. But accountability becomes distorted if it is framed as though Rohingya civilians face danger only from the junta.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP

Human Rights Watch has documented severe restrictions and grave abuses by the Arakan Army against Rohingya in areas under its control, including arbitrary detention, mistreatment, pillage, forced labour and unlawful recruitment. Its 2026 reporting also documented an alleged massacre at Hoyyar Siri and called for independent investigation and accountability.

This creates a dangerous contradiction. One perpetrator network is under sustained international legal scrutiny, while another armed force that now governs large parts of Rakhine can still operate outside the same level of judicial attention.

That does not weaken the case against the Myanmar military. It strengthens the principle behind accountability: the standard should attach to conduct, not to political alignment. A force does not acquire immunity from scrutiny simply because it opposes the junta.

For the Rohingya, the issue is practical as well as legal. The same civilian population that survived military persecution now faces restrictions, coercion and violence under a different authority.

> *"The reason to pursue justice for genocide is not to punish one enemy while overlooking another. It is to affirm that no armed actor has the right to destroy, terrorise or politically erase a people."*
>
> ONE STANDARD FOR ALL ARMED ACTORS

LIBERATION CANNOT BE A LICENCE TO PERSECUTE

The Arakan Army has benefited from a political narrative that presents it primarily as a force resisting Myanmar's military. Opposition to an abusive junta cannot, by itself, establish the legitimacy of another armed movement.

The relevant test is how a force treats civilians under its control, particularly minorities and populations with little political power. Human Rights Watch reported in 2025 that Rohingya civilians under AA authority faced restrictions on movement and livelihoods, arbitrary detention, mistreatment, forced labour and forced recruitment. In May 2026, Human Rights Watch also published evidence concerning the alleged Hoyyar Siri massacre, including verified imagery of human remains, witness testimony and satellite analysis, and called for independent investigation.

The article therefore rejects the idea that accountability should follow political convenience. International humanitarian law applies to armed groups as well as state forces, and abuses against civilians do not become less serious because the perpetrator is fighting the junta.

For the Rohingya, that distinction is central. A post-junta order that reproduces discrimination, dispossession and coercion would not resolve the crisis; it would simply transfer power from one armed authority to another.

NO EXEMPTION FROM ACCOUNTABILITY

Investigators, governments, UN mechanisms and human-rights organisations should document violations by all parties with the same seriousness. It argues that states supporting accountability at the ICJ and ICC should also press for scrutiny of contemporary abuses in Arakan Army-controlled areas.

That does not mean the legal situations are identical. The ICJ case concerns Myanmar's obligations as a state under the Genocide Convention, while the ICC investigation concerns individual criminal responsibility for alleged crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. Allegations involving the Arakan Army would require their own evidence, legal analysis and jurisdictional pathway.

But the principle is consistent: civilians should not lose protection because the identity of the armed actor changes.

THE MEANING OF JUSTICE

For the Rohingya, justice is more than a courtroom event. It means being able to live in Arakan without fear of burning, starvation, forced displacement, arbitrary detention or political erasure.

The ICJ and ICC processes remain essential to accountability for alleged crimes by Myanmar's military. At the same time, the article argues that those processes will feel incomplete to Rohingya civilians if contemporary abuses by other forces remain outside meaningful scrutiny.

The core claim is therefore not that every actor is legally situated in the same way, but that the protection of Rohingya civilians must not depend on which armed force controls the territory.

ACCOUNTABILITY AT A GLANCE

ICJ — STATE RESPONSIBILITY

The Gambia v. Myanmar concerns alleged violations of the Genocide Convention. In January 2020, the Court indicated provisional measures requiring Myanmar to prevent acts within Article II of the Convention and preserve evidence. Those measures did not determine the merits of the case.

ICC — INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

The ICC's Bangladesh/Myanmar investigation covers alleged crimes within the Court's jurisdiction committed at least partly on the territory of Bangladesh. On 27 November 2024, the Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing for alleged crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution of the Rohingya. As of 2026, the application remained pending.

ARAKAN ARMY — CURRENT SCRUTINY

Human Rights Watch has documented grave abuses by the Arakan Army against Rohingya civilians, including arbitrary detention, movement restrictions, mistreatment, forced labour and unlawful recruitment. Its May 2026 Hoyyar Siri investigation called for independent investigation and accountability.

The legal pathways are different, but the underlying protection principle is the same: no armed actor should be beyond scrutiny for abuses against civilians.

Sources: International Court of Justice; International Criminal Court; Human Rights Watch. Legal characterisations remain subject to competent judicial findings.

POLITICS & RIGHTS

THE ROHINGYA CRISIS IS UNRESOLVED BY CHOICE NOT BY COMPLEXITY

THE CORE PROBLEM IS NOT A SHORTAGE OF POLICY SOLUTIONS BUT REPEATED POLITICAL DECISIONS TO DENY RECOGNITION, CITIZENSHIP, EQUALITY AND PARTICIPATION.

1982

CITIZENSHIP LAW REMAINS CENTRAL TO THE DEBATE OVER ROHINGYA STATELESSNESS

THE CRISIS WAS MANUFACTURED

The article rejects the idea that the Rohingya crisis is simply too complicated to solve. It argues that statelessness, exclusion and mass displacement were produced through law and policy, above all through the denial of equal citizenship and recognition.

Human Rights Watch has documented decades of discrimination and repression against Rohingya, including the impact of the 1982 Citizenship Law. Fortify Rights has likewise argued that denial of equal access to citizenship, coercive National Verification Card processes and exclusion from Myanmar's recognised ethnic framework lie at the root of the crisis.

The central claim is political: once identity and citizenship are denied, restrictions on movement, education, marriage, livelihoods and representation become structural rather than accidental.

That is why it says the language of "complexity" can become a way of postponing decisions that are already well understood.

THE MILITARY CHOSE EXCLUSION

Myanmar's military bears primary responsibility for turning discrimination into a system of persecution. It argues that laws, administrative practices, propaganda and coercion were used over decades to treat the Rohingya as outsiders in their own homeland.

International legal proceedings now address alleged atrocity crimes committed against the Rohingya, but the article argues that courts alone cannot dismantle the political structures that made those crimes possible.

Citizenship, identity, movement, land, education and political participation are therefore presented not as secondary questions, but as the foundation of any durable resolution.

The article's position is that accountability and reform must proceed together: punishing past crimes without changing discriminatory structures risks leaving the underlying crisis intact.

MAINSTREAM POLITICS ALSO CHOSE AVOIDANCE

Responsibility cannot be reduced to the military alone. It criticises mainstream political actors who spoke broadly about democracy and federalism while avoiding explicit recognition of Rohingya identity and equal citizenship.

That avoidance, the article says, was not neutral. By treating Rohingya rights as politically inconvenient or indefinitely postponable, political actors left the architecture of exclusion largely intact.

The article is careful to distinguish Buddhism as a faith from Buddhist majoritarian politics. Its criticism is directed at ethnonationalist political mobilisation that has portrayed Rohingya as outsiders, demographic threats or security risks.

It argues that a democratic order cannot be genuinely inclusive if the majority effectively retains the power to decide whether a minority belongs at all.

RAKHINE NATIONALISM CANNOT ESCAPE THIS QUESTION

The same test applies to political forces seeking greater Rakhine self-determination. The history of Rakhine grievances under Burman domination does not justify domination of another community.

Human Rights Watch reported in 2025 that the Arakan Army imposed severe movement restrictions and committed grave abuses against Rohingya under its control, including arbitrary detention, mistreatment, pillage, forced labour and unlawful recruitment.

FEDERAL DEMOCRACY REQUIRES ROHINGYA INCLUSION

Rohingya inclusion is a test of whether a future federal democratic Myanmar can move beyond the exclusionary structures of the past.

It argues that equal membership requires more than humanitarian protection. It requires citizenship on an equal basis, recognition of Rohingya identity, political participation, land and property rights, freedom of movement, access to education and security guarantees.

There have been some shifts within the anti-junta movement. The National Unity Government issued a 2021 policy recognising Rohingya rights and later approved replacement of the 1982 Citizenship Law with a framework intended to reduce statelessness. Fortify Rights has welcomed those steps while continuing to call for fuller Rohingya participation in decision-making.

A distinction must therefore be made between promising policy commitments and implementation. Its argument is that a federal order that formally embraces diversity but leaves the Rohingya outside the political community would reproduce exclusion under a new constitutional language.

The central question is not whether Myanmar can design a federal system. It is whether that system will recognise the Rohingya as equal members of it.

THE ISSUE IS NOT LACK OF IDEAS BUT LACK OF COURAGE

The broad policy direction has been known for years: reform discriminatory citizenship structures, end coercive documentation practices, recognise Rohingya identity, restore equal rights, protect land and movement, and ensure Rohingya participation in political negotiations.

It therefore frames the unresolved crisis as a failure of political will rather than technical imagination.

Some actors have moved further than others. The National Unity Government's 2021 Rohingya policy and its later approval of a replacement for the 1982 Citizenship Law mark significant departures from earlier state policy. But rights groups have continued to argue that formal commitments must be matched by implementation, representation and protection on the ground.

The article also insists that Rakhine self-determination and Rohingya equality cannot be treated as competing goals. A stable political settlement would need to accommodate the rights and security of both communities rather than requiring one to disappear for the other to advance.

WHAT RESOLUTION REQUIRES

The proposed settlement is straightforward in principle: recognition of Rohingya identity, equal citizenship, return and restitution where possible, political representation, freedom of movement, access to education and livelihoods, and security guarantees.

A POLITICAL DECISION, NOT A MIRACLE

The article closes by arguing that no federal democratic future can be credible while one community remains outside the political order.

Its conclusion is not that Myanmar's conflicts are simple. They are not. Questions of federalism, territorial authority, armed groups, displacement, accountability and intercommunal trust are all difficult. The narrower claim is that the core rights questions facing the Rohingya are already identifiable.

Equal citizenship is a policy choice. Recognition of identity is a policy choice. Inclusion in constitutional dialogue is a policy choice. Protecting civilians, property and freedom of movement is a policy choice.

The manuscript therefore asks readers to distinguish between complexity in implementation and ambiguity about principle. It argues that the principle should be clear: Rohingya cannot remain stateless, politically erased or permanently excluded from the future of Myanmar.

"A federal order that recognises every group except the Rohingya is not federal democracy; it is structured exclusion with new branding."

Sources informing factual context: Human Rights Watch and Fortify Rights. The article's broader political argument remains that of the manuscript.

MARITIME CRISIS
Record Rohingya Deaths at Sea and More Bodies in 2026

THE SEA IS NOW A GRAVEYARD
By the time the world notices Rohingya bodies in the water, the politics that put them there have already done their work. Maritime deaths are not separate from the wider Rohingya crisis but one of its clearest consequences.

UNHCR reported on 17 April 2026 that nearly 900 Rohingya refugees were reported missing or dead in the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal during 2025, making it the deadliest year on record for Rohingya maritime movements in South and Southeast Asia. More than 6,500 Rohingya attempted dangerous sea crossings that year, with about one in seven reported missing or dead.

The trend continued into 2026. UNHCR said more than 2,800 Rohingya had undertaken dangerous sea journeys between January and 13 April.

The central argument is that the sea does not create this crisis. It receives people pushed out by persecution, statelessness, prolonged encampment, shrinking assistance and the absence of durable solutions.

WHY 2025 BECAME THE DEADLIEST YEAR
The number is shocking, but the causes are familiar. UNHCR's figures show both the scale of departures and the extraordinary mortality of the route. In recent years, more than half of those making these journeys have been women and children.

Overcrowded and unseaworthy boats are only one part of the danger. Rescue capacity is inconsistent, disembarkation can become politicised, smugglers operate with impunity, and governments often rely on deterrence even when people believe remaining where they are is no longer viable.

The 2025 toll followed repeated warnings. In May 2025, UNHCR said two boat tragedies off Myanmar were feared to have killed 427 Rohingya and that nearly one in five people attempting sea movements in the region at that point in the year had been reported dead or missing.

THE CRISIS BEGINS ON LAND
Maritime deaths cannot be understood only as a smuggling or irregular-migration problem. Those factors matter, but they do not explain why people continue to board dangerous boats.

For Rohingya in Myanmar, the push factors include persecution, violence, restrictions and blocked futures. For refugees in Bangladesh, prolonged camp life, limited livelihoods, reduced assistance and fading hopes of return intensify desperation. The water is the final stage of a chain of failures on land.

A REGIONAL FAILURE

The maritime death toll exposes failures at several levels at once: protection in Myanmar, conditions in Bangladesh, rescue and disembarkation at sea, responsibility-sharing across the region, and sustained humanitarian funding.

UNHCR has repeatedly called on states to strengthen search and rescue, allow safe disembarkation and uphold obligations to assist people in distress at sea. It has also stressed that until conditions in Rakhine permit safe, voluntary and dignified return, life-saving support for Rohingya refugees and host communities remains essential.

The article's argument is that deterrence alone cannot resolve a crisis driven by fear and hopelessness. When refugees believe that remaining in place offers no viable future, the danger of the journey does not necessarily stop departure.

WHAT THIS DEATH TOLL IS TELLING US

The record number of deaths and disappearances in 2025 is presented as more than a humanitarian statistic. It is evidence that the Rohingya crisis remains unresolved across citizenship, protection, return, livelihoods and regional responsibility-sharing.

It also links maritime movement directly back to Arakan: as long as Rohingya cannot live there safely and with rights, dangerous onward movement will continue to be one of the consequences.

THE STEPS THE REGION MUST TAKE NOW

Three immediate priorities follow.

First, regional governments should strengthen search-and-rescue capacity, permit prompt disembarkation and avoid pushbacks or prolonged disputes over responsibility while lives are at risk.


Second, international donors should maintain adequate humanitarian support in Bangladesh and across the region, while expanding access to education, livelihoods and protection that reduce the desperation driving dangerous journeys.

Third, the political roots of flight must be addressed through rights, security and conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified return to Myanmar.

The article closes with its central claim: Rohingya are not dying at sea simply because the ocean is dangerous. They are dying because the choices available to them on land have become intolerable.

2025 was the deadliest year on record for Rohingya maritime movements in South and Southeast Asia. By 13 April 2026, UNHCR had already recorded more than 2,800 Rohingya undertaking dangerous sea journeys that year.

Sources informing factual context: UNHCR. The wider analysis and recommendations reflect the article's analysis.





DESPATCHES FROM ARAKAN

FORCED RECRUITMENT REPORTS DEEPEN FEAR IN ROHINGYA COMMUNITIES

Rohingya Khobor reported a series of incidents during April and May 2026 in which Rohingya families and youths said they faced pressure connected to Arakan Army recruitment activities in Buthidaung and nearby areas.

On 22 April, the outlet reported that more than 300 Rohingya boys and over 50 girls who had been taken for military training were temporarily allowed to visit their families after around 40 to 45 days at a camp in Ywet Nyo Daung, Buthidaung Township. The report relied on local sources and testimony from a boy who said many of those at the camp were children.

Three days later, Rohingya Khobor reported that around 20 Rohingya youths, including children aged about 14 to 15, were forcibly taken near the jetty of Mee Zar village in Paletwa Township. Witnesses told the outlet that young people were removed from boats after Arakan Army members stopped them at the port.

Other April and May reports described families fleeing after receiving orders concerning daughters, and village meetings where residents said they were instructed to support military-related training. These claims are based on local-source reporting from conflict-affected areas where independent access remains extremely limited.

The pattern matters because recruitment pressure is not occurring in isolation. Rohingya communities in northern Rakhine are already living with displacement, movement restrictions, destroyed homes and uncertainty over their political status.

Rohingya Khobor's 13 June overview of conditions in Maungdaw and Buthidaung said families continued to report displacement, travel restrictions, fear of military recruitment and loss of homes. Residents described difficulty finding safety and stability while armed actors exercised increasing control over everyday life.

The outlet also reported an 8 May meeting in Buthidaung at which Arakan Army representatives addressed Rohingya residents from four villages. Residents said identity, return and the future of displaced communities were discussed, but objected to the reported use of the term "Rohingya Bengali", saying it denied their ethnic identity.

Taken together, the reports show how recruitment concerns, identity disputes and territorial control are increasingly intersecting in the daily lives of Rohingya civilians.

Source: Rohingya Khobor, April–June 2026. Allegations attributed to local residents remain subject to independent verification.

DESPATCHES FROM ARAKAN

At Least 115 Villages Destroyed Across Arakan Since the 2021 Coup

A Bellingcat investigation reported by Rohingya Khobor on 31 May 2026 found that at least 115 villages across Arakan State had been partially or completely destroyed since Myanmar's February 2021 military coup.

The investigation combined satellite imagery, conflict data and field reporting to document destruction across Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Ann, Sittwe and Kyaukphyu townships. Some locations had reportedly been damaged more than once after residents attempted to rebuild.

Rohingya Khobor highlighted Buthidaung as one of the areas suffering extensive destruction. The wider investigation also recorded damage near strategically important areas including Sittwe and Kyaukphyu as conflict expanded across the state.

The findings provide a broader picture of the civilian cost of the war beyond individual incidents. Destroyed homes, repeated displacement and damaged village infrastructure leave communities facing long-term obstacles even when frontline fighting moves elsewhere.

The same period saw continued aerial attacks by Myanmar's military in areas under Arakan Army control. Rohingya Khobor reported on 10 May that airstrikes and fighting affected parts of Minbya and Kyauktaw, with residents describing repeated bombing raids, damaged homes and civilian casualties.

For Rohingya communities, physical destruction compounds an already severe protection crisis. Villages lost to fighting cannot easily be rebuilt when residents also face movement restrictions, insecure land tenure, humanitarian access problems and continuing displacement.

The Bellingcat findings are particularly significant because satellite evidence can document destruction in locations where journalists and independent monitors have little or no physical access. It does not, by itself, establish responsibility for every damaged settlement; attribution requires incident-by-incident evidence.

Source: Bellingcat investigation, as reported by Rohingya Khobor, 31 May 2026; Rohingya Khobor reporting on airstrikes, 10 May 2026.

REGIONAL & COMMUNITY BRIEFS

INDIA–BANGLADESH PUSH-INS

On 14 June, Rohingya Khobor reported that more than 120 Rohingya refugees registered with UNHCR in India remained in camps in Bangladesh after being pushed across the border. Bangladeshi officials cited by the outlet said 123 people had entered Bangladesh between May and July 2025 and were later placed in camps in Ukhiya and Teknaf. The episode illustrates the precarious legal position of Rohingya refugees across the region and the risks created when states move people across borders without durable protection arrangements.

ARAKAN VILLAGE MAP LAUNCHED

On 24 April, Rohingya Khobor held a certificate ceremony in Cox's Bazar and formally launched its Arakan Village Map project. The initiative was developed to document and preserve the history, names and locations of Rohingya villages, while the event also recognised trainees who completed a three-day digital storytelling course organised in collaboration with Al Jazeera. The project provides a constructive counterpoint to the quarter's security reporting: preserving place names, local memory and community journalism while displacement continues.

Sources: Rohingya Khobor, 24 April and 14 June 2026.



Q2 NEWS SOURCES
RohingyaKhobor.com
April–June 2026

ARNO PRESS RELEASE

ARNO Welcomes Universal Jurisdiction Filing in Indonesia

12 APRIL 2026

The Arakan Rohingya National Organisation welcomed the filing in Indonesia of a universal-jurisdiction complaint concerning alleged genocide against Myanmar's military leader Min Aung Hlaing.

In its statement, ARNO described the filing as another step toward justice and accountability in a country where impunity for grave human-rights violations has remained entrenched for decades. The organisation argued that universal jurisdiction can provide additional legal pathways where national or international accountability mechanisms remain limited.

ARNO also called on other Asian states to examine whether their domestic penal codes could allow similar proceedings for serious international crimes. It pointed to Indonesia's legal framework as an example of how national courts may be used to pursue accountability beyond the territory where alleged crimes occurred.

The release stressed that such efforts should not be limited to one actor. ARNO called for accountability mechanisms to examine abuses committed by all forces currently targeting Rohingya civilians and contributing to violence in Arakan.

The organisation linked justice directly to the prospects for Rohingya return, arguing that continuing violence and impunity in Arakan are major obstacles to safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation.

Universal jurisdiction allows domestic courts in some countries to investigate and prosecute certain grave international crimes even when those crimes were committed elsewhere and neither the victims nor the alleged perpetrators are nationals of that state. The scope and admissibility of such cases depend on each country's laws and judicial procedures.

ARNO's April statement therefore presented the Indonesian filing not as a final legal determination but as an additional accountability avenue. The complaint itself does not establish criminal responsibility; that requires investigation and judicial process.

ARNO concluded by urging Indonesia and other states considering universal-jurisdiction cases to ensure that contemporary abuses affecting Rohingya communities are also subject to serious scrutiny.

Source: ARNO press release, 12 April 2026.

ARNO PRESS RELEASE

ARNO CONGRATULATES DR KHALILUR RAHMAN ON HIS ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

3 JUNE 2026

ARNO congratulated Dr Khalilur Rahman, Bangladesh's Foreign Minister, on his election as President of the United Nations General Assembly.

The organisation praised his diplomatic career, commitment to multilateralism and engagement on the Rohingya issue, while placing his election within the wider challenge of securing a durable solution to the Rohingya crisis.

ARNO acknowledged Bangladesh's long role in hosting Rohingya refugees displaced from Arakan and said the international community must continue to support Bangladesh while addressing the political conditions that prevent return.

The statement expressed hope that the UN General Assembly would give sustained attention to safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable repatriation. ARNO stressed that return must be accompanied by restoration of citizenship, fundamental rights, security guarantees and international protection mechanisms rather than being treated as a logistical transfer alone.

The press release also reiterated ARNO's position that accountability for alleged genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes remains central to any lasting solution.

It called on the international community to address what ARNO describes as the root causes of the crisis, including statelessness, insecurity and denial of rights, while pursuing justice for crimes committed against Rohingya civilians.

ARNO said the global Rohingya community viewed Dr Rahman's election with "hope and cautious optimism" and stated that it was ready to engage constructively with him and the United Nations system on a rights-based resolution of the crisis.

The statement was congratulatory in tone, but its policy message was clear: international diplomacy on the Rohingya should connect humanitarian support, accountability, citizenship and conditions for safe return rather than treating those issues separately.

Source: ARNO press release, 3 June 2026.

ARNO POLICY BRIEF

Rohingya Rights, Accountability, and the Reality in Myanmar

APRIL 2026

Alongside its Q2 press releases, ARNO published a policy brief examining how Myanmar's changing territorial and political landscape affects the Rohingya crisis.

The brief argues that assumptions built around a single central authority no longer reflect conditions on the ground. Large parts of Rakhine State are under different forms of armed control, and protection, governance and accountability therefore need to be understood through the behaviour of the actors exercising real power over civilians.

ARNO warns against political engagement that normalises authorities or armed actors while overlooking ongoing rights violations. It argues that international policy should remain anchored in accountability, civilian protection and the rights of the Rohingya rather than adapting to new power arrangements at the expense of those principles.

The document also links current realities in Rakhine to international legal obligations, arguing that changing territorial control does not remove duties to prevent atrocity crimes or protect civilians.

The policy brief's central message is that the Rohingya crisis cannot be treated as a legacy issue belonging only to the 2017 atrocities. ARNO argues that present-day restrictions, displacement and abuses must be part of any serious international assessment of Myanmar.

It also cautions against repatriation initiatives that focus on return numbers without addressing citizenship, freedom of movement, security, property rights and meaningful political inclusion.

For policymakers, the brief calls for a rights-based framework that links diplomacy, humanitarian action and accountability. It argues that sustainable return requires more than physical access to Rakhine: Rohingya must be able to return as recognised rights-bearing members of society.

The brief forms part of ARNO's wider Q2 emphasis on accountability beyond a single perpetrator and on ensuring that geopolitical or diplomatic engagement does not eclipse the rights of Rohingya civilians.

Source: ARNO, "Rohingya Rights, Accountability, and the Reality in Myanmar," April 2026.

Policy Brief | Continued

Rohingya Rights, Accountability, and the Reality in Myanmar

ARNO's April 2026 brief sets out a framework centred on rights, accountability, political realities on the ground and verifiable conditions for any future return.

The brief warns that the Rohingya crisis is evolving rather than resolving, and that international engagement built on outdated assumptions risks doing more harm than good. Its central message is direct: protection, governance, and accountability in Rakhine State must be reassessed in light of the dramatic changes in the political and territorial landscape.

A Changed Political and Territorial Landscape

The brief underscores a fundamental shift in Myanmar's political and territorial order. The military authorities are attempting to project legitimacy through a controlled electoral process, yet conditions on the ground remain defined by fragmentation, instability, and continued violations against Rohingya communities. Large parts of Rakhine State are no longer under the military's unified control. This produces a complex environment in which questions of civilian protection, local governance, and accountability can no longer be understood through the binary frameworks of the past. For ARNO, recognising this reality is the necessary first step toward any credible policy response.

Identity and Citizenship at the Core

ARNO reaffirms the legal and historical status of the Rohingya as an integral part of Myanmar's population. The brief insists that the continued denial of identity, citizenship, and basic rights remains at the very core of the crisis, not a secondary concern to be deferred. Any meaningful policy response, it argues, must confront this denial directly. Solutions that sidestep the citizenship question treat the symptoms of the crisis while leaving its root cause intact, ensuring that vulnerability and statelessness persist across generations.

Accountability Must Not Be Sidelined

A central warning in the brief is that efforts to normalise relations with the authorities through controlled political processes risk entrenching impunity and undermining international legal obligations. ARNO stresses that accountability mechanisms, including those linked to the Genocide Convention and ongoing international legal proceedings, remain essential and must be sustained rather than traded away for the appearance of stability. Superficial political normalisation, the brief cautions, would reward perpetrators and signal that atrocities carry no consequences.

Repatriation Only on Verifiable Conditions

On the question of return, the brief is unambiguous: any discussion of repatriation must be grounded in verifiable conditions on the ground. These include genuine safety, dignity, the restoration of rights, and credible protection mechanisms.

Without such guarantees, return processes risk failure and further harm to an already devastated population. Premature or politically motivated repatriation, ARNO argues, would expose returnees to the same dangers they fled.

ARNO's Call to the International Community

The brief calls on the United Nations, individual states, regional actors, and humanitarian partners to align their engagement with the realities on the ground rather than with diplomatic convenience.

ARNO sets out four priorities for responsible engagement:

- Maintain sustained pressure for accountability for past and ongoing crimes against the Rohingya.
- Reject superficial political normalisation that would legitimise authorities while violations continue.
- Ensure independent access to affected areas for monitors, investigators, and humanitarian actors.
- Place Rohingya rights at the centre of all policy decisions affecting Rakhine State and its people.

Conclusion

ARNO presents this policy brief as a framework to support informed decision-making and more effective engagement toward justice, protection, and sustainable solutions. Its underlying conviction is that durable peace in Rakhine State cannot be built on impunity, denial, or unverified promises of return. It can only be achieved through accountability, the restoration of Rohingya identity and citizenship, and a policy approach that places the rights and lived realities of the Rohingya people at its heart.

Read the full report: ***https://www.rohingya.org/?sdm_process_download=1&download_id=2078***





About ARNO

The Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) emerged in 1998 as a broad-based organisation of the Rohingya people with a pledge to promote 'Rohingya unity' and to realise the hopes and aspirations of the Rohingya people.

www.rohingya.org

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